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Rights do not exist without corresponding obligations. As with
all rights, the right to reproduce has a flip-side, viz. the duty
and responsibility to control it. Matters of life and death and
ethical issues surrounding the beginning and end of life are at
the heart of bioethical debates. The view that life is a gift that is
not ours to give and take is at the heart of the religious and
moral tradition. However, the taking of life seems to attract
more moral consideration than the giving. The ethics of adding
more people to life rather than more life to people is
conspicuously shunned. As noted by Campbell et al.,1
‘ironically, the sanctity with which we endow all human life
often works to the detriment of those unfortunate humans
whose lives hold no prospect except suffering’.
The Malthusian conundrum
Concerns with ‘irresponsible’ procreation date back to John
Stuart Mill; similarly, worries about what we would now call
the earth’s ‘carrying capacity’ have been notoriously expressed
by Thomas R Malthus. Mill placed the duty to care for children
whose parents are unable to cope with their parental
responsibilities squarely on society. However, this is unrealistic
in communities where social services and infrastructure are
non-existent or insufficiently developed. Malthus, on the other
hand, advocated two checks that put responsibility on the
individual; namely what he coined ‘moral restraint’ (refraining
from promiscuity and prostitution) and ‘prudential restraint’
(delaying the age of marriage).
The Malthusian thesis that population increase will
ultimately exhaust the earth’s resources and food production
capacity is still hotly debated. A large number of biologists and
environmentalists are of the opinion that population growth is
a major contributor to the worrisome current state of the
planet. On the other side of the fence, sceptical environ-
mentalists, such as Lomborg,2 defend the position that never in
the past has there been as much food cheaply available as now,
and that the world’s population will stabilise in the decades
ahead. Poverty, he claims, results from unequal and unjust
distribution of goods. Eradicate poverty, provide food and a
clean world, and the developing world will automatically limit
reproduction.3 Whatever the view, optimistic or pessimistic, the
population issue must be faced in the broad perspective of our
planet, north, south, east and west. There seems to be a real
case for curbing population growth.
What are the options? La Follette4 has suggested the
provocative concept of licensing parents. His argument is
straightforward. Prospective foster parents are thoroughly
screened before adoption, why should the same not apply to
biological parents? Inevitably this outrages the advocates of
autonomy and of the right to procreate as one sees fit and
wishes, let alone those raising the spectre of eugenics. Equally
controversial is the option called ‘lifeboat ethics’. According to
this view a lifeboat can achieve its goal of saving its occupants
only by letting those swimming around drown. It follows from
this thesis that the poor should be left alone. An intermediate
position has been defended by Singer.5 Writing about the 1970
famine in Bangladesh, Singer defends the utilitarian view that
our moral duties obligate us to sacrifice part of our well-being
to the welfare of others, neighbours and strangers alike. In a
postscript added to a later reprint of the same paper, Singer
linked aid given to the developing world with a reciprocal
obligation for those countries to limit their population growth.6
In his recent book, Our Planet,7 the postscript was omitted. Was
the postscript merely a slip of the tongue, too offensive and too
sensitive to be repeated?
The rights conundrum
Cohen8 reminds us that when addressing a right we should
examine its content, its source, its target, and its possible
conflicts. The content of the right to reproduce ranges from
women’s right to choose if and when to embark on a
pregnancy, to access to reproductive health (safe abortion,
contraception, and safe motherhood),9 and to the right to use
womanhood as a political platform to gain rights at large.10
According to this perspective, reproductive right-holders are
exclusively women. This is quite understandable since women
bear not only the joys but also the burdens and risks of
motherhood. There is unequivocal and ample evidence
showing the major health hazards linked to pregnancy and
childbirth. A major difficulty remains, however, in defining
what exactly the term reproductive rights mean. What is the
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source? The right to reproduce is enshrined in Article 25 (2) of
the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Human
rights result from the mere fact of being human. One might
argue that all that is human is not good per se, and that apart
from the capacity for reasoning, other behaviours (called
instincts) are shared with non-human animals. Nonetheless,
what should distinguish us from non-human animals is that
our ‘animal’ behaviours are supposed to be regulated and
controlled by reason. This implies that our reproductive
instincts should be controlled. Against whom are the rights
held? Granted that overt and covert patriarchism has and still
does limit the full exercise of women’s rights, the battle is
unlikely to be won by exclusion or opposition. Can men really
not be taken on board? Arguably, the other shortcoming of this
view is that it is oblivious to the concept that reproductive
health is not the only issue at stake. The exercise of the right to
procreate has much wider social and global implications. As
emphasised by Callahan,11 excessive emphasis on autonomy (as
is the case in mainstream Western bioethics) tends to obscure
moral obligations to the human community. Humans carry the
responsibility for determining how their own welfare is to be
balanced against the welfare of other living creatures, human
and non-human, current and future. This, then, leads to the
fundamental ethical question: Does the current rate of
population growth enhance or diminish the human condition
and the well-being of our planet? Does it advance human
welfare and the integrity of the planet (assuming that both are
inescapably intertwined) while respecting what it means to be
human? The honest and hopefully unbiased answer seems to
be no. We need to assume that this is a very likely prospect in
the future, unless proven otherwise. So if in doubt, abstain.
Following the tenets of two mainstream moral theories,
deontology and consequentialism, there are two good
anthropocentric moral reasons to restrict the right to procreate.
Kant’s categorical imperative, in one of its versions, says that it
is wrong to treat others as mere means to an end. History, past
and present, is not short of indications that, globally, children
were and are mere means to an end, be it to secure succession
and inheritance, or to function as child labour, slaves, warriors,
beggars or parents’ social security.12 For this to change, certain
traditional mores have to come under pressure.
Consequentialism tells us that it is the consequences of our
actions that determine their goodness or wrongness. The vital
statistics issued, for instance, by the World Health Organization
or by the World Bank provide a vivid picture of the burden
imposed on women and children as a direct result of
reproduction and poverty.3 By not empowering women to
make sexual choices many of them are condemned to serious
morbidity if not death, and their children are forced to live in
poverty, abuse, or to die prematurely. The question that follows
is: Are people poor because they beget (too) many children, or
does poverty force them to beget those children? The answer
divides people into opposing camps.3
At this point it should arguably be safe to say that the
ethical question is not whether population growth should be
curbed, but how. Ethics and politics, however, are often at
loggerheads. As pointed out by Callicott and da Rocha13 at
Earth Summits, ‘not only is there no agreement to curb
population — the ultimate cause of the Earth’s ecological woes
in the eyes of many environmentalists — but proceedings on
human population problems have been boycotted by some
governments’. The ‘how’ brings us to the thorny issue of
China’s ‘one-child’ and Singapore’s ‘two-child’ policies.14-16 It is
argued that China would not have needed a ‘one-child’ policy
if Mao had not put a ban on contraception and abortion. It is
also said that its implementation was facilitated by the
Confucian tradition rooted in patriarchism. However, the
serious infringements on human rights by both the Chinese
and the Singaporean policies are of major concern, let alone the
(alleged or real) covert eugenic driving forces of both. Less
known or publicised is the highly successful Sri Lankan birth
control policy based on motivation, persuasion and education.17
It shows that things can be achieved smoothly.
The reproductive rights conundrum
Is contraception the answer then? Battin has argued that one of
the main obstacles to contraception is the negative perception it
entails, namely that it is a ‘negative choice to prevent
pregnancy’. Instead, she says, ‘sustaining or siring a pregnancy
should be a positive choice’ that should make contraception
more acceptable.18 Some so-called ‘feminist’ writers, especially
those advocating abortion rights, add fuel to the debate by
putting (too) strong emphasis on the side-effects, health
hazards, and failure of contraception.15 While it is true that not
all contraceptive methods suit all women, one must also
acknowledge the fact that most of the risks are linked to
unhealthy lifestyle or genetic predisposition. Furthermore, it is
fair to say that the toll exacted by pregnancy, planned or not, is
much worse. The impact contraception has had so far on
population growth is diversely appreciated. It cannot be denied
that it does have an effect. Sceptics would argue that it is a
dirty trick to maintain the sovereignty and domination of the
rich over the poor. Optimists would argue that, to some extent,
it empowers women to make reproductive choices but that the
demand exceeds availability in the developing world, thereby
increasing the number of unwanted pregnancies and abortions.
Ironically and sadly, where contraception is readily available,
as it is in developed countries, half of pregnancies are still
unplanned and half of unplanned pregnancies are terminated.
Data indicate that the overall success of the acceptance of
contraception depends on the perception of its necessity.19 For
instance, every Dutch child is planned; it is perceived as a
moral obligation not to undertake a pregnancy unless family
finances are sound. Holland has the lowest abortion and
teenage pregnancy rates in the world. To underline the
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message that contraception is part of a citizen’s duty rather
than a private matter the Dutch government made the pill
available free of charge. As Hadley put it, ‘[in Holland]
contraception is like getting a driver’s license before you begin
to drive’.15 According to Barbara Katz Rothman, American
women consider contraception more as a responsibility than a
right.19
Current debates on population growth and the concept of
women’s reproductive rights are both stronger and more
contested than ever. However, as emphasised by Hadley15 (in
line with LaFollette’s argument4), ‘A right is a hollow
abstraction . . . “It’s my right” is an individualistic stance
relying on autonomy, privacy and bodily integrity to defy any
outside scrutiny or comment. Being a parent is not a raw
biological state of being, it is a social role: that is what adoption
is about.’ She further argues that a rights approach should be
replaced by a humanitarian approach in order to create an
atmosphere of greater public responsibility for what we now
see as a private matter.15
To question reproductive freedom is a venture onto a
human rights minefield. Beginning to question the morality of
the unrestricted right to procreate is bound to ignite fierce
opposition. In a number of Western countries, amid concern
about falling birth rates, women are being urged to have babies
‘for the sake of the nation . . . or else the nation will die’.15 In
these same countries, exhaustion of pension funds calls for
drastic measures: work longer and/or procreate more
(forfeiting Kant’s admonition not to use people as a mere
means to an end). Clearly this is also incompatible with the
view that since the planet’s carrying capacity is limited we
have a duty to each other and to future generations not to
exceed this limit through unrestricted (and unilateral)
procreation. The needed paradigm shift should be to put the
right to procreate in its social and global perspective.
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